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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-4476
___________
JOHNATHAN ROBINS, as an individual and
on behalf of his son, J.R.,
Appellant
v.
JUDGE MICHAEL F.X. COLL;
MICHAEL WARD; MASTER JUDGE;
PA DOMESTIC RELATIONS BRANCH
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2:11-cv-07501)
District Judge: Honorable Timothy J. Savage
____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
April 4, 2013
Before: FUENTES, FISHER and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 9, 2013)
_________
OPINION
_________
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PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Johnathan Robins appeals the District Court’s order dismissing
his complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the District
Court’s order. See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 & n.4 (3d Cir.
2010). For the reasons set forth below, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s
judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
Because we primarily write for the parties, we will only recite the facts necessary
for our discussion. Robins brought this pro se civil rights action on his own behalf and
on behalf of his minor son, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against an unidentified “Master
Judge,” Judge Michael Coll of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, the
Delaware County Court- Domestic Relations Division, and Michael Ward, a
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare County Assistance Office caseworker.
Robins alleged violations of his First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights
throughout child support proceedings involving Robins’ minor child, including Judge
Coll’s decision to hold Robins in contempt of court and to lodge a detainer against him.
Robins’ complaint against Ward was that he interfered with his right to care for his child
by allowing the child’s maternal grandmother to file for medical assistance on behalf of
the child. In response to the defendants motion to dismiss, Robins filed an amended
complaint, which asserted the same claims against the defendants, but dropped the claims
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against Ward in his official capacity. The defendants moved to dismiss the amended
complaint, which the District Court granted.1 Robins filed a timely appeal.
We agree with the District Court’s dismissal of all of Robins’ claims on behalf of
his minor son. It is well established in this Circuit that the right to proceed pro se in
federal court does not give non-lawyer parents the right to represent their children in
proceedings before a federal court. See Osei-Afriyie ex rel. Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of
Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1991). Moreover, we agree that Judge Coll and
Master Judge are protected by absolute judicial immunity. A judge “in the performance
of his duties has absolute immunity from suit and will not be liable for his judicial acts.”
Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,
12 (1991)). “A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in
error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to
liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)). The allegations in Robins’ complaint
relate to actions taken by Judge Coll and Master Judge in their capacity as a judges.
Assessing child support and issuing court orders are routine, typical functions of judges,
and there are no allegations that Judge Coll and Master Judge clearly lacked jurisdiction
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The District Court granted Robins leave to file a second amended complaint,
which merely recouched his First Amendment claims as arising out of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Because Robins’ claims were dismissed on other grounds, the District
Court did not address the question of whether he properly plead the elements of a
substantive due process violation. We agree with the District Court in this regard.
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in their rulings. Thus, Robins’ allegations are insufficient to overcome Judge Coll’s and
Master Judge’s judicial immunity.
With respect to the claims against the Delaware County Court- Domestic
Relations Division, we conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Robins’
claims because Delaware County Court- Domestic Relations Division is not a person
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Callahan v. City of Phila., 207 F.3d 668, 673 (3d Cir.
2000). Finally, we agree with the District Court that Ward’s decision to allow Robins’
child’s grandmother to file for medical assistance under her welfare plan on behalf of the
child did not deprive Robins of his right to care for and control his child. See Anspach ex
rel. Anspach v. City of Philadelphia Dept. of Pub. Health, 503 F.3d 256, 262-263 (3d Cir.
2007).
For these reasons, the appeal presents no substantial question and we will
summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.2
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We agree with the District Court that offering leave to amend for a third time
would have been futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d
Cir. 2002).
4

